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NOTES
IS PREJUDICE NECESSARY TO LIABILITY INSURER'S DEFENSE
OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE COOPERATION CLAUSE?
Automobile liability insurance policies today almost univers-
ally include so-called "cooperation" clauses.1 In general, these
clauses provide that as a condition of the policy, the insured
must cooperate with the insurer in the conduct of any suits
based thereon, and must not settle any such claims without the
full knowledge and consent of the insurance company. It is
now established that, under certain circumstances, failure of
the insured to comply with the cooperation clause gives the
insurer a valid defense against an injured third party.2  How-
ever, the question is far from resolved as to whether the
insurer must, in order to establish its defense based on the
non-compliance with the clause, show affirmatively that such
non-compliance by the insured has operated to its prejudice.
Those courts which hold that the insurer should be permitted
a valid defense even though the failure to cooperate has not
prejudiced its cause in any way either regard the compliance
by the insured as a condition precedent' to recovery, to be strictly
1. "Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured. The insured shall co-
operate with the company and, upon the company's request, shall attend
hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing and
giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses and in the conduct
of suits. The insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make
any payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense other than for
such immediate medical and surgical relief to others as shall be impera-
tive at the time of the accident." State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.
v. Arghyris et al., 189 Va. 913, 916, 55 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1949).
2. The leading case is Hynding v. Home Accident Insurance Co., 219 Cal.
743, 7 P.2d 999 (1932). A contrary decision had previously been reached
in Edwards v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (1929).
It was there held that the insured's non-compliance with the cooperation
clause could not stand as a defense against the injured person even
though the insurer had thereby been prejudiced. However, the case was
later overruled by Jackson et ux v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,
23 So.2d 765 (La. App. 1945). The Jackson case was reversed on appeal,
211 La. 19, 29 So.2d 177 (1946), only because the upper court held that
the evidence showed that the insurer was not "substantially prejudiced,"
that there was no fraud or collusion, and the insured's conduct was rea-
sonable under the circumstances. Thus it was recognized that the injured
party's action might have been extinguished if the insured's failure to co-
operate had been of a different nature.
3. N. J. Fidelity & Plate Glass Insurance Co. v. Love, 43 F.2d 82 (4th
Cir. 1930); Bachhuber v. Boosalis, 200 Wis. 574, 229 N.W. 117 (1930).
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construed, or conceive of such failure as inherently prejudicial
to the insurer.4 On the other hand, those courts which have
denied the insurer a defense in the absence of a showing of
prejudice and have allowed recovery by the injured third party
in such situations have made little or no attempt to present a
satisfactory explanation for reaching the results they deem
equitable.5 The conclusion has usually been justified by a mere
statement as to the relative hardship of the insurer on the one
hand and the innocent injured third party on the other.
The issue is pointed up with unusual clarity in a recent
Virginia decision.6 One Bohler, who was operating the insured's
automobile with the latter's permission and hence within the
"omnibus" coverage clause,7 was in an automobile accident in
which a minor child was injured. Several days later,8 Bohler
telephoned the insurer's agent, informing him that he, Bohler,
had been erroneously accused of having been involved in an
accident. After the original false denial of complicity, and
after making affidavits which substantially confirmed his orig-
inal story, Bohler, without the knowledge of the insurer or its
agents, pleaded guilty to a criminal charge of "hit-and-run"
driving' relative to the same accident. Such conduct on the
part of Bohler constituted a flagrant and unquestioned violation
of the clause.
4. Fischer v. Western & Southern Indemnity Co., 106 S.W.2d 490 (Mo.
App. 1937); Bauman v. Western & Southern Indemnity Co., 230 Mo. App.
835, 77 S.W.2d 496 (1934).
5. Conroy v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 292 Pa. 219, 140 Atl. 905(1928); George v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 219 Ala. 307,
122 So. 174 (1929); Cowell v. Employers' Indemnitiy Corp., 326 Mo. 1103,
34 S.W.2d 705 (1930); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Albritton, 214 Ky.
16, 282 S.W. 187 (1926); Glade v. General Mutual Ins. Association 216
Iowa 622, 246 N.W. 794 (1933); see Notes, 72 A.L.R. 1455 (1931), 98
A.L.R. 1469 (1935).
6. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Arghyris et al., 189 Va.
913, 55 S.E.2d 16 (1949).
7. The "omnibus clause" extends the coverage to any one operating the
automobile with the permission of the insured. The court does not make
a point of the fact that the failure to cooperate was on the part of the
insured's bailee, rather than the insured himself. It thus may be assumed
that such bailee, within the omnibus provisions, occupies the same posi-
tion as the insured in respect to the cooperation clause.
8. The exact time was not established by the evidence. The accident had
occurred May 7, 1947, and the telephone conversation was established only
as some time prior to May 12, 1947.
9. Bohler stated that his reason for pleading guilty was that if he re.
ceived a sentence of more than six months, he would be automatically dis.
charged from the Navy.
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The plaintiff-minor brought a civil suit against Bohler based
on the alleged accident, as did the father for damages arising
out of the son's injuries. Judgment was rendered for the plain-
tiff in each action, and execution was returned unsatisfied
because of "No Effects"; the father and son then instituted two
actions to recover from the insurer the amount of the two
unsatisfied judgments. On motion of the parties, the two actions
were consolidated.
The insurer defended on the ground that Bohler had not
complied with the cooperation clause, and the plaintiffs did not
attempt to controvert the fact of non-compliance. However, the
issue drawn in the trial court was whether such non-compliance
had prejudiced the insurer, and the findings were in the negative.
The trial court determined that the insurer had been sufficiently
apprised of the facts, and thus not prejudiced in its defense of
the suit. Judgment was then entered for the plaintiffs and the
defendant-insurer took a writ of error to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia.
The appellate court, after noting that the question of law was
one of first instance in Virginia,0 held that the trial court had
misconstrued the true issue, and that the mere fact of non-
compliance with the cooperation clause was sufficient to absolve
the insurer from liability. It thus held the question of prejudice
immaterial. In so doing, the court in effect treated compliance
with the cooperation clause as a condition precedent to the
liability of the insurer, the breach of which of itself precludes
recovery.
It is well settled that a failure on the part of the insured to
cooperate with the insurer gives a valid defense to the insurer
where it has been prejudiced." Furthermore, there is consider-
able authority today that the insurer may escape liability even
though not prejudiced by failure to cooperate. 2  In Coleman
r,. New A msterdam Casualty Co., "3 the court declared compliance
10. The only previous Virginia case on the same issue was Indemnity
Ins. Co. of North America v. Davis' Adm'r., 150 Va. 778, 143 S.E. 328
(1928). But the insurer's liability was there predicated upon its prema-
ture and unwarranted repudiation of responsibilities under the contract,
constituting a waiver of its defense. Thus whether a showing of prejudice
was necessary to the defense did not have to be decided.
11. Hynding v. Home Accident Insurance Co., 214 Cal. 743, 7 P.2d 999
(1932).
12. See note 2, .s ,pra.
13. 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928).
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with the clause to be a condition precedent to recovery by the
injured party. Therefore the fact that cooperation would in
no way have aided the insurer was held to be immaterial. Said
Chief Justice Cardozo of the Court of Appeals:
The argument (that a full disclosure would have revealed
no defense to the insurer) misconceives the effect of a
refusal. Cooperation with the insurer is one of the con-
ditions of the policy. When the condition was broken, the
policy was at an end, if the insurer so elected. The case is
not one of the breach of a mere covenant, where the conse-
quences may vary with fluctuations of the damage. There
has been a failure to fulfill a condition upon which obliga-
tion is dependent.14
This same view may take another form, as shown by an
opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1931.11 There the
court adopted a modification of the condition precedent doctrine
by ruling that prejudice was to be presumed from the very
failure to cooperate. Apparently the court regarded the failure
to cooperate as inherently prejudicial, for it said:
Without the presence of the insured, and his aid in preparing
the case for trial, the insurance company is handicapped and
such lack of cooperation must result in making the action
incapable of defense.16
It should be noted, however, that in this case the failure to
cooperate was very likely prejudicial, since the insured was the
only witness available. However, the language of the court to
the effect that the lack of cooperation ipso facto results in prej-
udice to the insurer is common. This type of reasoning leads
to the same result as the condition precedent doctrine itself,
holding an affimative showing of prejudice unnecessary to the
defense.
The authority that prejudice to the insurer is vital to the
defense is well predicated upon the dictum in Hynding v. Home
Accident Insurance Co.,"7 the leading case establishing that the
insurer's defense might be asserted against the injured third
party. There, the insured failed to assist the insurer in obtain-
ing witnesses and even failed to testify at the trial, although
the defendant-insurer had tendered him his expenses. The
14. Id. at 276, 160 N.E. at 369.
15. Schneider v. Autoist Mutual Insurance Company, 346 Il1. 137, 178
N.E. 466 (1931).16. Id. at 140. 178 N.E. at 468.
17. 214 Cal. 743, 7 P.2d 999 (1932).
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court's holding was clearly based on the prejudice of the insurer's
interest resulting from the non-compliance. Thus the court
stated:
We are also of the opinion, and think most of the authorities
are agreed . . . that the violation of the condition by the
assured cannot be a valid defense against the injured party
unless it appears in a particular case that the insurance
company was substantially prejudiced thereby."
And again:
Under these circumstances, the company was clearly prej-
udiced by his failure to appear. In any event, the question
of such prejudice should have been considered below. 9
Some courts, in following the Hynding case, have observed
the important qualification recited therein, disallowing the
defense in the absence of prejudice. Thus the Supreme Court
of Errors and Appeals of Connecticut, in Ranchon v. Preferred
Ace. Ins. Co. of N. Y.,10 held that even where the insured de-
liberately misinformed the insurer, there was no violation of
the cooperation clause, because the failure to cooperate must
have adversely affected the insurer's interests in some sub-
stantial and material way. The court reasoned that since the
true information would not have availed the insurer, the latter
was not deprived of any advantage by the insured's conduct.
Thus the clause is held not even to be violated where no prejudice
is shown. Whether one agrees with the result, it is apparent
that the court is reading something into the cooperation clause
which is not contained therein.2
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana (Second Circuit) squarely
met the issue in Levy v. Indemnity Ins. Co. 22 In this case the
insured brought the action against the insurer as curator for
the injured party, his brother. In determining whether the
insurer's defense should depend upon a showing of prejudice,
the court recognized the split of authority, and then adopted
the rule requiring that prejudice be shown. The court quoted
from 6 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice:
However, in order that there may be a breach of a condition
requiring the insured to cooperate with the liability insurer,
18. Id. at 752, 7 P.2d at 1002.
19. Ibid.
20. 118 Conn. 190, 171 Atl. 429 (1934).
21. There is of course no language in the "cooperation clause" to the
effect that it is complied with if no prejudice results to the insurer.
22. 8 So.2d 774 (La. App. 1942).
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so as to avoid the latter's liability under the policy, lack of
cooperation must be material; and it is necessary, in
order to establish a defense under such a provision, that
the insurer show that the failure of the insured to cooperate
with it was of such gravity as to prejudice it.23
It is submitted that the better view both legalistically and in
common fairness is that, in the absence of a positive showing
by the insurer that its position was prejudiced by the violation
of the cooperation clause by the insured, the injured person
should prevail.
As a matter of strict legal reasoning, this conclusion is reached
by noticing what the nature of the cooperation clause really is
and thereby what the legal effect of its violation should be.
The first obvious fact is that the time during which the insured
is called upon to cooperate is after the automobile accident, when
the cause of action against the insurer has already arisen. It
is thus post-casual in point of time and designed only to aid the
insurer defend an action, the other party to which has already
sustained a loss. Thus the non-compliance, if it be held a
defense, would extinguish an already existent cause of action,
operating as a condition subsequent, 4 rather than as a condition
precedent as mislabled by many courts. For reasons already sug-
gested, the performance of a post-casual condition, a condition
subsequent in insurance law, should be liberally construed and in
fact has been by the courts. 5 A typical illustration is that of
the condition that proofs of loss be furnished the insurer. In
construing such a condition in the policy, the courts have
properly regarded the fact that whereas the insured stands to
lose the advantage of a contract right perfected all the way up
to the point of loss, the insurer, on the other hand, seeks only
the assurance that it be properly apprised of -the loss."' In
view of the relative hardships in such a situation, substantial
performance of the post-casual condition has been very generally
held sufficient.-
23. Id. at 780.
24. VANCE, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE LAW 780, 781 (2d ed. 1930).
25. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 5481 (1930).
26. Further, there is more reason for liberal construction in favor of the
entirely innocent party suing on a liability policy than for the insured in
other situations whose own conduct may have placed him in default.27. Kravat v. Indem. Ins. Co. of North America, 152 F.2d 336 (6th Cir.
1946); Burbank v. National Cas. Co., 43 Cal. App.2d 773, 111 P.2d 740(1941); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stinson, 111 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1940);
State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Watkins, 181 Miss. 859, 180 So. 78 (1938); Crowe
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss2/4
NOTES
It should be noted that the treatment of a condition subse-
quent in insurance law is different from a condition subsequent
in contract law generally. In the latter, no latitude is allowed
in the requirement and anything less than strict compliance
will operate to extinguish the cause of action.28
It would seem further that compliance would be substantial
up to the point at which its shortcomings cause actual prejudice
to the insurer. One important purpose of the cooperation
clause and its validity as upheld by the courts is to protect the
insurer against collusive conduct and afford it every opportunity
to formulate any valid defenses it might have. When there
are no such defenses available in any event, the failure to
cooperate should not be said to defeat the purposes of the clause;
and when the purposes of the clause are not defeated, it would
seem that it has been substantially complied with.
Common fairness points the same way. The words of the
court in Edwards v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.2" indicate the rela-
tive hardships:
As to the hardship and disadvantage under which the
insurer labors, and the difficulty under which the injured
party finds himself, we think that the ends of justice require
that the benefit of the doubt should be given the injured
party, who is in no way at fault and whose loss was caused
entirely by someone else, as against the insurer who has
entered into the contract with full knowledge of the statute
and for a monetary consideration."
A recognition of the nature of the cooperation clause provides
the reasoning for the conclusion reached by some courts that
the question of prejudice is the one upon which liability should
depend. Thus an affirmative showing of prejudice is properly
held to be a necessary element in the liability insurer's defense
based on the non-compliance with the cooperation clause by the
insured, when asserted against the injured third person.
ARTHUR H. SLONIM
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28. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 675, 809 (2d ed. 1938).
29. 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (1929).
30. Id. at 178, 123 So. at 163.
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